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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-RIGHT TO 
CouNSEL UNDER SECTION 2255 OF THE JUDICIAL CODE-Petitioner, seeking to 
attack a conviction for illegal possession of narcotics,1 was granted leave to 
sue in form.a pauperis under 28 U.S.C. section 2255,2 but his request that 
counsel be appointed for him was denied. Petitioner's section 2255 motion 
to vacate judgment was denied.3 Petitioner then entered a second section 
2255 petition alleging basically the same errors but adding that the court 
had erred in not appointing counsel for his first petition. The second 
motion was denied without a hearing on the ground that it was "the second 
or successive motion for similar relief .... "4 Petitioner appealed in forma 
pauperis to the Seventh Circuit from the denial of his second section 2255 
motion. The Seventh Circuit unanimously affirmed the district court's 
1 The conviction was affirmed in United States v. Campbell, 282 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 
1960). 
2 "A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress 
claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in viola• 
tion of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdic• 
tion to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized 
by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the 
sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence •••• The sentencing court shall 
not be required to entertain a second or successive motion for similar relief on behalf of 
the same prisoner." 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1958). 
s The Supreme Court denied certiorari on this motion. 369 U.S. 825 (1962). 
4 28 u.s.c. § 2255 (1958). 
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denial of the second section 2255 motion.5 On rehearing, held, reversed. 
The rationale of the recent Supreme Court decision in Gideon v. Wain-
wright6 indicates that counsel must be appointed for an indigent in a 
section 2255 proceeding. Campbell v. United States, 318 F.2d 874 (7th Cir. 
1963). 
In Johnson v. Zerbst1 the Supreme Court held that, in general, a defend-
ant has a right to counsel in federal criminal trials, and recently this right 
was'extended to encompass federal criminal appeals.8 However, the Supreme 
Court has never decided specifically whether such a right exists in a third 
substantial area of federal criminal litigation, namely, collateral attack 
proceedings as prescribed by 28 U.S.C. section 2255.9 In the absence of a 
definitive Supreme Court ruling upon this issue, the circuit courts have 
reached variant results.10 In a majority of the circuits the appointment of 
counsel for a section 2255 proceeding is purely discretionary.11 A few 
circuits have held that the right to counsel in a section 2255 proceeding 
is contingent upon the nature of the issues raised under the motion;12 and 
in one case the Second Circuit suggested that the right may indeed be 
absolute.13 The majority rule is apparently based on the idea that section 
Ii No. 13846, 7th Cir., March 18, 1963. 
6 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
7 304 U.S. 458 (1938). 
8 See Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963); 
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Ellis v. United States, 356 U.S. 674 (1958); 
Johnson v. United States, 352 U.S. 565 (1957). Some gaps still remain in the appellate 
procedure. For example, in the interim period between conviction and appointment of 
appeal counsel the indigent is left to his own devices to get necessary papers filed in time 
to maintain appellate privileges. See Bosky, The Right to Counsel in Appellate Proceedings, 
45 MINN. L. REV. 783 (1961). 
o In addition, the Supreme Court has never decided the issue of right to counsel in 
habeas corpus proceedings. A § 2255 motion is, by the terms of the statute, either a sub• 
stitutc for, or a preliminary action to, a habeas corpus proceeding. The purpese of § 2255 
is to hold any required hearing in the sentencing court because of the inconvenience of 
transporting court officials and witnesses to the district of confinement. Habeas corpus 
actions must be brought in the district of confinement. As a result, § 2255 generally enjoys 
more popularity than habeas corpus as a means of collateral attack. 
10 It should be noted that although § 2255 does not specifically provide for the 
representation of the prisoner by council, the indigent can make use of § 1915(d), which 
provides for counsel in federal proceedings. "The court may request an attorney to 
represent any such person unable to employ counsel and may dismiss the case if the allega• 
tion of poverty is untrue or if satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious." 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1915(d) (Supp. IV, 1963). The discretionary language in § 1915(d) has been interpreted 
to provide an absolute right to counsel. Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); Lane 
v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963); Johnson v. United States, 352 U.S. 565 (1957). 
11 Listed in the order of the circuits, the most recent cases expounding the majority 
rule arc Green v. United States, 256 F.2d 483 (1st Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 854 
(1958); United States v. Caufield, 207 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1953); Taylor v. United States, 
229 F.2d 826 (8th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 986 (1956); Edwards v. United States, 
286 F.2d 704 (9th Cir. 1961); Tubbs v. United States, 249 F.2d 37 (10th Cir. 1957). 
12 These circuits have drawn a distinction between issues raised involving questions. 
of fact (the indigent being entitled to counsel) and issues involving questions of law (ap-
pointment of counsel being purely discretionary): United States v. Neims, 291 F.2d 39()' 
(4th Cir. 1961); Pruitt v. United States, 217 F.2d 648 (5th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 
907 (1955). 
13 United States v. Paglia, 190 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1951). 
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2255 proceedings are primarily civil in nature and hence do not fall 
within the ambit of rights granted protection to defendants in "criminal 
prosecutions" by the sixth amendment. Appointment of counsel is there-
fore properly said to be left in the discretion of the reviewing court.14 
While categorizing section 2255 proceedings as civil rather than criminal 
seems unrealistic, this approach was nevertheless the foundation of the 
rule followed by the Seventh Circuit prior to the principal case.11s 
Although the Supreme Court's attitude toward the issue is unclear, dicta 
in two Supreme Court cases would seem to indicate that the Supreme 
Court does not consider appointment of counsel mandatory in a section 
2255 action. In United States v. Hayman16 the Supreme Court noted that 
"unlike the criminal trial where the guilt of the defendant is in issue . • . 
a proceeding under section 2255 is an independent and collateral inquiry 
into the validity of the conviction."17 The labelling of a section 2255 pro-
ceeding as an "independent and collateral inquiry" was apparently the 
basis of the Seventh Circuit's prior adherence to the discretionary appoint-
ment rule.18 In addition, in Sanders v. United States19 the Court, again in 
dictum, stated the following in discussing section 2255: 
"[W]e think it clear that the sentencing court has discretion to ascer-
tain whether the claim is substantial before granting a full evidentiary 
hearing. In this connection, the sentencing court might find it useful 
to appoint counsel to represent the applicant."20 
However, in deciding the principal case the Seventh Circuit rejected 
the dicta in Hayman and Sanders and chose instead to be guided by its view 
of the implications of the recent Supreme Court decision in Gideon v. 
Wainwright.21 Gideon specifically held that the fourteenth amendment re-
quires the states to follow the federal rule established under the sixth 
amendment and to appoint counsel in criminal prosecutions unless the 
right is competently and intelligently waived. It is important to note that 
Gideon itself had no direct effect upon section 2255 proceedings. In dealing 
only with the elementary rights of state criminal defendants, Gideon did not 
overtly purport to modify what was already settled in federal courts.22 In 
14 For an excellent discussion of the history of § 2255 in the circuit courts, see Comment, 
30 U. CHI. L. REv. 583 (1963). 
15 United States v. Caufield, 207 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1953). The rule was reiterated in 
the Seventh Circuit only five months before the principal case. McCartney v. United 
States, 311 F.2d 475 (7th Cir. 1963). 
16 342 U.S. 205 (1952). 
11 Id. at 222. 
18 McCartney v. United States, 311 F.2d 475 (7th Cir. 1963). 
10 373 U.S. I (1963), 62 MxcH. L. REv. 903 (1964). 
20 373 U.S. at 21. (Emphasis added.) In Sanders, however, the Court also indicated that 
it considered § 2255 to be a "criminal collateral procedure" and not a civil procedure. 
Id. at 22. 
21 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
22 The significance of Gideon v. Wainwright has been well recognized. See Comment, 11 
LOYOLA L. REv. 288 (1963); Note, 77 HARV. L. REv. 103 (1963); Note, 39 NOTRE DAME LAW. 
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addition, Sanders, containing the dictum indicating that appointment of 
counsel in a section 2255 proceeding is still discretionary, was decided after 
Gideon. In fact, the Seventh Circuit even conceded that Gideon did not 
dictate the result in the principal case. The majority opinion in the prin-
cipal case stated: 
"The precise holding in Gideon does not require this result. The 
holding there involved a state conviction, not a motion under 28 
U.S.C. § 2255. We are convinced, however, that the Supreme Court's 
view of the right to counsel reflected in the Gideon opinion indicates 
the result we have reached."28 
The important question, therefore, is why the Seventh Circuit purposely 
ignored the dicta in Hayman and Sanders, and instead applied the Gideon 
philosophy beyond the literal meaning indicated by the Supreme Court. 
The reasons, although not fully discussed by the court, seem obvious. The 
twentieth century American ideal of justice would seem to be sweeping 
enough to include as many safeguards to justice as are reasonably possible.24 
Mr. Justice Black said in Gideon: 
"[R]eason and reflection require us to recognize that in our adversary 
system of criminal justice any person haled into court, who is too poor 
to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is pro-
vided for him. This seems to be an obvious truth. . . ."211 
In other words, the Seventh Circuit believes that the same safeguards made 
mandatory in state courts by Gideon should also be made mandatory in 
section 2255 actions. The extension of Gideon is the court's means to this 
desired end. 
The principal case, therefore, shows that the repercussions of Gideon 
will probably not be limited to state court proceedings. The Seventh Cir-
cuit has implied from Gideon the conclusion that the mandate is applicable 
to any action, whether labelled criminal or civil, related to an original crim-
inal prosecution. As Mr. Justice Sutherland once said of the indigent, "He 
243 (1963); Note, 65 W. VA. L. REv. 297 (1963); 15 Au. L. REv. 568 (1963); 49 A.B.A.J. 587 
(1963); 12 DE PAUL L. REv. 306 (1963); 26 GA. B.J. 96 (1963); 47 MARQ. L. REv. 111 (1963); 
37 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 358 (1963); 32 U. CrNc. L. REv. 408 (1963); 24 U. Pm. L. REv. 851 
(1963). 
28 Principal case at 875. 
24 See Kamisar, The Right to Counsel and the Fourteenth Amendment: A Dialogue 
on "the Most Pervasive Right" of an Accused, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1962). In this regard 
Gideon may have raised more questions than it answered. For example, should the right 
to counsel be extended to an indigent at the moment of arrest, at the police interrogation, 
or at trial? See Beany, Right to Counsel Before Arraignment, 45 MINN. L. REv. 771 (1961); 
Douglas, foreword to The Right to Counsel: A Symposium, 45 MINN. L. REv. 693 (1961). 
Should the right to counsel encompass misdemeanors as well as felonies? See Comment, 
48 CALIF. L. REv. 501 (1960), 
211 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335,344 (1963). 
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requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings 
against him."26 
Gerald ]. Laba 
26 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932). 
